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POLICY CHALLENGE
Euro-area governance needs to move beyond the improvements brought
about by banking union and should establish institutions to prevent diver-
gences of wages from productivity. We propose the creation of a European
Competitiveness Council composed of national competitiveness councils,
and the creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fis-
cal debt sustainability and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. The EFP
should have the right in exceptional circumstances to declare national
deficits unlawful and to be able to force parliaments to borrow more so that
the euro-area fiscal stance is appro-
priate. A euro-area chamber of the
European Parliament would have to
approve such decisions. No addi-
tional risk-sharing would be
introduced. In the short term, domes-
tic demand needs to be increased in
surplus countries, while in deficit
countries, structural reform needs to
reduce past divergences.
Real effective exchange rates, relative to
the rest of the euro area, % change
THE ISSUE Reform of the governance of the euro area is being held back by
disagreement on what is at the root of the euro area’s woes. Pre-crisis, the
euro area suffered from the built-up of financial imbalances, price and wage
divergence and an insufficient focus on debt sustainability. During the crisis,
the main problems were slow resolution of banking problems, an inadequate
fiscal policy stance in 2011-13 for the area as a whole, insufficient domestic
demand in surplus countries and slow progress with structural reforms to
overcome past divergences.
Source: Bruegel. Selected euro-area countries.
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EURO-AREA GOVERNANCE: WHAT TO REFORM AND HOW TO DO IT
1. See, for example,
Carney (2015). Recent
ECB measures are
welcome but may prove
insufficient to prevent a
lost decade.
2. See Sapir (2005).
General policy
complacency and the
great moderation were
further factors leading
to the build-up of
imbalances.
3. In particular, the
bank resolution frame-
work, the deposit
insurance system and
capital markets union
are important elements
for further work.
JUST AS IT WAS CELEBRATING its
tenth anniversary, the euro area
was hit by a financial crisis that
started in the United States but
rapidly spread to Europe. Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU)
was ill prepared to deal with the
immediate crisis and the large fis-
cal, financial and structural
imbalances that had accumu-
lated over the years. The financial
crisis turned first, in 2010, into a
Greek sovereign crisis and then,
in 2011-12, into a full-blown
bank-sovereign debt crisis that at
one point threatened the very
existence of the monetary union.
The debt crisis has now abated
but an economic crisis, with fee-
ble growth and near-zero inflation,
has replaced it. A lost decade
beckons for the euro area, but its
governments have been slow to
respond1.
The euro area has two features
that have been particularly
responsible for the crisis and for
the difficulty of resolving it: major
economic (and also political and
social) differences between coun-
tries2 resulting in some cases in
failed policies, and the euro area’s
inadequate economic gover-
nance. Reform of this governance
is needed in three major areas.
First, although fairly integrated,
especially within the euro area,
Europe’s banking and finance
system was left to operate with-
out corresponding supervisory
and resolution structures. Bank-
ing Union and various
macro-prudential measures con-
stitute a proper institutional
response, though they will need
to be improved in due course – a
subject that is beyond the scope
of this Policy Brief3. Second, in the
absence of a nominal exchange
rate and without a fully integrated
labour market, the euro area
needs a system to prevent large
divergences between the unit
labour cost (ULC) developments
in its member countries. Third, the
euro area needs a fiscal gover-
nance system to (1) ensure the
fiscal sustainability of individual
members, (2) to generate an
appropriate area-wide fiscal
stance, and (3) to quickly provide
fiscal resources for
prompt resolution in
the event of banking
and sovereign crises.
We propose medium-
term governance
reforms to address
the second and third
of these issues,
before concluding
with the most pressing short-term
challenges.
THE RUN UP TO THE CRISIS:
EMU’S SHORTCOMINGS
From the outset, the euro area
comprised two groups of coun-
tries with substantially different
socio-economic models and con-
sequently different macro-
economic policies and outcomes:
the core countries that belonged
to (or shadowed) the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) for more
than a decade prior to the launch
of the euro, and the peripheral
countries that stayed mostly out-
side the ERM.
Different initial conditions in the
core and the periphery, mainly in
terms of interest rates, led to the
credit boom in the periphery
financed by capital flows from the
core. This led to increasing com-
petitiveness problems within the
euro area, which were insuffi-
ciently monitored and difficult to
counter in the absence of the
exchange rate instrument. As a
result, current-account balances
and net foreign asset positions
diverged to an unprecedented
degree between the core (in sur-
plus) and the periphery (in
deficit). When the financial crisis
hit in 2008-09, private capital
flows from the core to the periph-
ery suddenly stopped (Merler and
Pisani-Ferry, 2012),
leaving behind a
mountain of external
(private and public)
debt in the periphery
owed to creditors in
the core countries.
Italian and French
price competitive-
ness diverged
relative to Germany, but neither
country ran significant current
account deficits.
Instead of producing sustainable
real convergence between the
core and the periphery, the single
currency had resulted in imbal-
ances and was ill-prepared to deal
with them. Insufficient attention
was paid to the build-up of finan-
cial imbalances. This failure was
not specific to the euro area, but
the European monetary union
was unique in that it lacked com-
mon supervision and resolution
mechanisms to properly address
financial crises within the inte-
grated financial system.
This shortcoming, along with
deeply entrenched opposition to
bank resolution in a system char-
acterised by major inter-
dependencies between political
systems and banks (Monnet et al,
2014), was a major hindrance in
‘The single
currency resulted in
imbalances and
was ill-prepared to
deal with them.’
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4. The so-called six-
pack, two-pack, Euro+
pact and the Fiscal
Compact. See
http://ec.europa.eu/eco
nomy_finance/articles/g
overnance/2012-03-
14_six_pack_en.htm.
5. From 7.5 percent in
2007 to 12 percent in
2013 (11.6 percent in
2014).
6. Stressed countries
including Cyprus,
Greece, Ireland, Portu-
gal and Spain reduced
their current-account
deficits on average by
around 10 percentage
points between 2007
and 2014. 
getting to grips with a European
financial-cum-sovereign-debt cri-
sis of considerable magnitude,
which evolved in 2011-12 from
the global financial crisis.
Another weakness of the euro
area's economic governance
architecture was that it lacked a
mechanism to monitor and cor-
rect macroeconomic imbalances,
except in budgetary policy.
Enforcement of the deficit rules
was inadequate, public debt sus-
tainability received relatively little
attention and private debt no
attention at all. Similarly, external
debt (and current account imbal-
ances) was all but ignored.
Moreover, no attention was paid
to long-term and persistent ULC
divergences.
The lack of focus on public debt
sustainability led to two types of
situations: (1) Fiscal rules were
insufficiently applied, partly
because there was inadequate
understanding of the debt sus-
tainability risks. Stricter
application of the rules would
have reduced future debt prob-
lems in Italy (and other countries)
and in Greece, where enough was
known to justify more forceful
demands for corrective action. (2)
Countries like Ireland and Spain
that, although they abided by the
fiscal rules, proved not to be
immune to debt problems once
the financial crisis erupted,
revealing the huge build-up of pri-
vate debt that led to problems for
their public finances.
Governance mechanisms to
address macroeconomic imbal-
ances such as wage divergences
do not exist in true federations
such as the United States. The
euro area needs mechanisms to
address both competitiveness
divergence and coordination of
fiscal policy, because labour
mobility is limited and fiscal pol-
icy decentralised.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT: WHAT
WORKED AND WHAT DID NOT?
When the global crisis triggered
the European crisis, the European
policy system was largely unpre-
pared. Crisis management during
2008-14 consisted of:
• A timely coordinated macro-
economic response in 2009
consisting of monetary-policy
easing, the European Central
Bank playing the role of unlim-
ited lender of last resort to
banks and a substantial
increase in fiscal deficits.
• Hesitant and delayed crisis
management, with countries
losing market access com-
bined with the gradual
establishment and reinforce-
ment of institutions that can
provide financial assistance
and impose conditions for pro-
viding that assistance.
• A gradual process starting with
the ‘Van Rompuy task force’
(European Council, 2010) to
strengthen EU surveillance
mechanisms, resulting in new
rules and mechanisms4.
• When the sovereign debt crisis
became more widespread and
yields increased substantially
in Italy and Spain, quicker fis-
cal consolidation and ECB
support was implemented
through the Securities Markets
Programme (SMP) and Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme.
• As banking and sovereign
stresses reinforced each other
and bank resolution was
delayed, the European Council
decided to establish a banking
union to de-link banks from
their sovereigns and increas-
ing financial stability. The
banking union project is now
officially finished.
The crisis response has not deliv-
ered economic results for the
euro area. GDP has not grown
since 2008, and unemployment
has increased5. Inflation has
fallen substantially and in
December 2014, area-wide defla-
tion (of -0.2 percent) was
recorded for the first time since
2009. Internal adjustment has
proceeded, with current-account
deficits shrinking substantially6.
However, current account sur-
pluses have, if anything,
increased in Germany and the
Netherlands, reaching 7 percent
of GDP or more in 2014. There was
some wage and price adjustment
in the crisis countries, but relative
prices between the three biggest
euro-area countries – Germany,
France and Italy – have adjusted
only marginally. The very low
area-wide inflation rate has not
helped: the lower it falls, the more
difficult it becomes to achieve the
necessary adjustment.
The euro area has not delivered.
What went wrong in the last seven
years, contributing to such a bad
economic performance? Besides
the severe macroeconomic imbal-
ances at the beginning of the
crisis, the following problems can
be identified:
• From 2011 to 2013, fiscal pol-
icy in the euro area was
pro-cyclical. In 2014, fiscal
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policy was flat and did not
counteract the continuing
deterioration of the economy.
Public investment and R&D
expenditure have been cut
during the crisis.
• Europe has taken a gradual
approach to bank resolution;
unresolved banking issues
continue to plague credit provi-
sioning in the euro area
(European Systemic Risk
Board, 2012). Banking prob-
lems were not addressed
because of national political
constraints and because of
possible fiscal consequences.
• The ECB has been slow to
respond to the deteriorating
economic situation and has
tried to avoid taking risk on
board. It also misjudged the
situation twice, resulting in
erroneous rate increases.
• No serious and significant
measures to address price
divergence between Germany,
France and Italy have been
undertaken. Structural reforms
progressed in all three coun-
tries largely in line with
national political constraints,
but were not commensurate
with the need for adjustment in
a monetary union where, by
definition, adjustment cannot
take place through exchange
rate changes. Moreover, no
euro-area wide demand man-
agement was undertaken to
facilitate relative adjustment.
This analysis highlights the two
central problems for euro-area
governance:
a) Fiscal policy: no institution is
responsible for the area-wide
fiscal stance and for the distri-
bution of fiscal policy across
countries, and no fiscal
resource (except the European
Stability Mechanism) is avail-
able for risk sharing, including
in banking.
b) Only a very weak mechanism
(the Macroeconomic Imbal-
ances Procedure) exists to
ensure that wage develop-
ments are in line with
productivity, which means
that serious competitiveness
problems can and
do occur within the
euro area. Wage
setting remains
mainly a national
process with little
or no regard for
euro-area develop-
ments. Other
national structural
policies are implemented with-
out consideration of
potentially substantial cross-
border effects.
Beyond these two governance
problems, some euro-area coun-
tries suffer from very significant
debt burdens and differences in
social and employment perform-
ances and in the structural
features of their economies.
These legacy problems make gov-
ernance reform significantly more
complicated.
ON WHAT GOVERNANCE REFORMS
SHOULD THE EU FOCUS?
The issue of sovereignty, or politi-
cal legitimacy over policies, lies
behind both governance prob-
lems we have highlighted.
Wages and competitiveness
In many countries, persistent ULC
increases were driven by unsus-
tainable asset price booms result-
ing in overheating labour markets.
The answer to such problems lies
in better macro- and micro-pru-
dential policies and better
regulation of the financial system,
which are beyond the scope of
this Policy Brief.
Yet trying to prevent asset booms
is not sufficient to address all
competitiveness problems in the
euro area, where
countries often have
labour markets and
social systems that
are incompatible with
their membership of a
monetary union.
Other reforms that
increase economic
dynamism – for
example the creation of a single
and competitive market or the
reduction of harmful regulation –
are also essential.
The functioning of national labour
markets must not lead to exces-
sive competitiveness divergence.
National wage formation and bar-
gaining systems vary widely. As a
result, the alignment of nominal
wage growth with labour produc-
tivity growth at national level also
tends to differ considerably in dif-
ferent countries. Such differences
lead to inter-country changes in
competitiveness, which are diffi-
cult to correct within the euro area
because of the absence of the
exchange rate instrument.
There are two basic solutions to
this problem. The first would be to
create a system comparable to a
true federation with a single
labour market. In the United
States, citizens accept the model,
in which they move regularly in
‘Preventing asset
booms will not
address all
competitiveness
problems in the
euro area.’
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EU legislation and their perform-
ance monitored by the European
Commission.
All euro-area countries should put
in place a competitiveness-moni-
toring framework involving
regular assessments and the def-
inition of instruments to prevent
problems. An interesting example
is the Belgian framework, intro-
duced in 1996 to preserve the
country’s competitiveness in EMU
by keeping the evolution of wages
in line with wage developments in
the main trading partners. A
national body regularly reports on
the evolution of Belgian competi-
tiveness relative to its three main
trading partners (Germany,
France and the Netherlands).
These reports are used by social
partners to fix a wage norm for the
next round of wage negotiations.
Although the norm amounts only
to a non-binding guideline, it has
generally been respected by the
private sector (to which the sys-
tem applies). In case social
partners fail to agree a wage norm
compatible with the
evolution of competi-
tiveness, the
government can step
in and make the norm
legally binding. The
system has worked
fairly well: it kept
untouched the wage
formation and bar-
gaining system that existed prior
to the euro, but made the behav-
iour of social partners compatible
with membership of the euro area.
The result has been that ULCs in
Belgium have evolved more-or-
less in line with those in its main
trading partners, thus avoiding
major competitiveness problems.
The Belgian system could be
improved, and anyway cannot be
exactly copied by other euro-area
countries since they typically have
different wage formation and bar-
gaining systems. What is important
is that all euro-area countries put in
place a mechanism to ensure that,
although operating within their
own system, the behaviour of
social partners and the outcome of
their wage negotiations is compati-
ble with membership of the euro
area in terms of competitiveness
and employment. These national
mechanisms would constitute
national competitiveness councils.
We would recommend therefore
the creation of a Eurosystem
Competitiveness Council (ECC)
consisting of both national com-
petitiveness councils and the
European Commission. The ECC’s
primary task would be to coordi-
nate the actions of national
competitiveness councils to
ensure that no euro-area country
fixes a wage norm that implies
significant competitiveness prob-
lems for itself and/or
others. In case this
fails, the Commission
should have the
power to require the
relevant competitive-
ness councils to take
corrective action
using the MIP and the
European Semester
instruments.
Fiscal policy
The euro area faces the choice of
either significantly moving ahead
with fiscal integration while
accepting that national parlia-
ments lose some power (eg
Marzinotto et al, 2011), or imple-
their lifetime from one state to
another. The cost of such moves
is limited because of the unified
market and the absence of lan-
guage barriers and barriers in the
welfare system.
The alternative model starts from
the assumption that it is neither
desirable nor feasible to create a
unified European labour market in
which a unified welfare system
would enable citizens to change
their country of residence several
times in their lifetimes. Some
increased mobility is probably
desirable and feasible, but we
also strongly believe that the euro
area will not for the foreseeable
future create such a unified
labour market in which regional
shocks can be essentially fixed
by large migration flows.
The euro area, therefore, needs
mechanisms to prevent and cor-
rect substantial misalignments of
competitiveness between its
member countries. Since wage
formation and bargaining sys-
tems are deeply rooted and
difficult to change, deviations in
competitiveness must be moni-
tored and corrected before they
become too significant and
entrenched.
At EU-level, the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) has
the potential to be an important
tool and should be applied sym-
metrically to correct excessive
positive and negative imbal-
ances. The MIP needs however to
be complemented by national
procedures to monitor and, if
needed, correct competitiveness
problems and to increase owner-
ship at the national level. These
procedures should be required by
‘All euro-area
countries should
put in place a
competitiveness-
monitoring
framework’
menting a fully decentralised
solution in which fiscal decisions
are taken completely at the
national level (eg Mody, 2013).
For the latter, it is essential to
have a credible no-bail-out regime
so that national decisions have
primarily national consequences.
The fully decentralised solution –
accepting defaults without mech-
anisms to safeguard financial
stability – would be politically,
socially and financially unstable7.
More worryingly, a decentralised
solution would not provide ade-
quate euro-area wide
stabilisation, thereby forcing
monetary policy to do more than
it can achieve8.
The euro area therefore needs to
have a fiscal mechanism to
reduce the pernicious effects of
recessions, increase financial
stability, reduce cross-border
contagion and manage the fallout
from debt restructuring should it
become necessary, while govern-
ment default should remain a
last-resort option. There should be
(a) the ability to steer a euro-area
wide fiscal stance, (b)
a fiscal capacity to
manage sovereign
debt and banking
crises, and (c) a dif-
ferent regulatory
framework for sover-
eign debt9. Since this
amounts to a limited
insurance system,
mechanisms would
have to be in place to manage the
risk of moral hazard.
The current system of fiscal rules
aims to establish smart, rules-
based fiscal governance.
However it fails in its aim because
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7. Technocratic solu-
tions such as indexing
bonds to GDP are
unlikely to be practical
and would require a
totally different regula-
tory framework. At the
minimum, a European
sovereign debt restruc-
turing mechanism
would be required; see
Gianviti et al (2010).
8. See, for example
Coeuré (2015) for a
recent discussion of
the argument originally
made by Lamfalussy. In
situations like the cur-
rent one, monetary
policy alone is insuffi-
cient to provide
adequate stabilisation.
9. In Sapir and Wolff
(2013), we argue for
the introduction of
exposure limits or risk
weights on sovereign
debt.
10. It establishes a
number of criteria that
try to take account of
the business cycle situ-
ation as well as debt
sustainability in a
rules-based framework.
However, the rules fail
to achieve what they
promise because of the
technical impossibility
of computing output
gaps, as has been
amply documented.
The discretion that is
applied as a result is
awkward and based on
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of faulty rules and ill-defined
national fiscal discretionary
space10. There is a need to adjust
the current EU fiscal governance
framework through several inter-
connected steps:
a) A reform of the fiscal frame-
work addressing moral
hazard. This could involve fis-
cal federalism by exception11,
with the focus of fiscal surveil-
lance on debt sustainability.
The closer a country moves to
unsustainability, the stronger
the intervention would be, with
ultimately the complete
removal of the ability to bor-
row. This enhanced
governance would come on top
of the ultimate possibility of
debt restructuring.
b) The fiscal framework should
not only be given debt sus-
tainability goals. It should
also ensure that the sum of
deficits in the euro area
achieves a reasonable area-
wide fiscal stance12. The new
framework would thus not only
have the right to prohibit bor-
rowing, overruling national
parliaments, but it
would also have the
right to force member
states to run higher
deficits, overruling
national parliament
decisions in substantial
euro-area recessions.
In other words, the
notion of ‘fiscal feder-
alism by exception’
should be symmetric. It should
apply to countries with both
dangerously excessive deficits
and insufficient borrowing from
a euro-area perspective.
c) The governance of fiscal sur-
veillance could be organised
in a Eurosystem of Fiscal Pol-
icy (EFP), composed of a
Governing Council (GC) that
would be comparable to the
Eurosystem of central banks.
At its centre would be a euro-
area finance minister13. This
person would prepare the
meetings of the GC together
with five budget directors that
have joint responsibility over
the ESM. All euro-area finance
ministers would also sit on the
GC. The GC would take fiscal
policy decisions based on
qualified majority with the six
central representatives having
a substantial vote. These deci-
sions would become binding at
the national level in case of
substantial danger to debt sus-
tainability or a substantial
euro-area recession. In normal
times, the size of fiscal deficits
would still be managed by the
national level and the recom-
mendations of the EFP would
not be fully binding.
d) The EFP would also have the
power to activate fiscal
resources of a fund, such as
the ESM, for special purposes.
This would include providing
support to individual member
states in the context of an ESM
programme, and backing-up
banks in cases of severe sys-
temic stress14.
e) Such a system would raise
substantial questions about its
legitimacy and the role of
national parliaments and the
European Parliament. The ESM
currently requires unanimity
among the finance ministers,
and prior parliamentary
approval in several countries.
This has proven to be complex.
At the same time, unanimity is
justified because the
‘The ECB would
be overburdened
if it had to
manage alone the
euro area
business cycle.’
resources needed to back up
the fund are national taxpay-
ers’ resources. This system is
ultimately unsustainable
because it regularly puts
national parliaments and deci-
sion makers in a position of
having to vote on matters that
could benefit banks elsewhere
or even other countries.
f) We would therefore imagine a
system, in which political legit-
imacy would be
allocated to the
European level
together with Euro-
pean tax-raising
power.  The Euro-
pean or euro-area
parliament would
be allowed to raise
a certain amount of
taxes to fund the
commitments of the common
fund in case the fund needs to
borrow for extraordinary cir-
cumstances. In other words,
the European fund would draw
on European resources requir-
ing European legitimacy. A
‘euro-area parliament’ would
thus provide legitimacy to
decisions on the ESM fund and
would also approve decisions
by the EFP-GC when they are
become binding on national
parliaments15.
g) This system would be a huge
change from the current sys-
tem, in which legitimacy of
fiscal policy – despite a treaty-
based framework of
coordination – derives from
national processes.  In the
Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy,
the majority decision would be
binding on national parlia-
ments in the sense that in
certain circumstances, their
ability to borrow would be
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complicated political and
technocratic compro-
mises.
11. As proposed by
Jean-Claude Trichet
(2011).
12. To achieve this, there
needs to be first and
foremost an agreement
that this is actually a
desirable policy goal. We
believe that our analysis
and the declining infla-
tion rates clearly
demonstrate the weak
fiscal dominance and
the substantial macro-
economic problem that
the euro area has.
13. A European budget
commissioner who can
reject national budgets if
they fail to respect the
rules, as Wolfgang
Schäuble put it in a
speech in Bruges in
March 2014 (Schäuble,
2014).
14. We thus envisage a
further development of
the ESM into a system in
which decisions are
taken based on majority
voting in the EFP instead
of unanimity of the ESM
finance ministers, as is
currently the case.
15. This was recently
advocated by German
finance minister Wolf-
gang Schäuble; see
footnote 13.
16. The EU Court of Jus-
tice's 2012 Pringle
EURO-AREA GOVERNANCE: WHAT TO REFORM AND HOW TO DO IT
removed or they would be
forced to borrow. Such a sys-
tem would only be credible if
the European Treaty and cer-
tain national constitutions
were to change. It is also possi-
ble to conceive such a system
without change to the Euro-
pean Treaty and instead with
the establishment of a new
intergovernmental treaty16.
h) To increase the new institu-
tion’s objectivity, we
also recommend the
creation of an inde-
pendent euro-area
fiscal council that
issues opinions on
the decisions taken
and in particular con-
firms whether there
are exceptional cir-
cumstances.
It is important to note that we do
not propose the creation of a ‘fed-
eral budget’. As essentially all
government spending would
remain at the national level, the
creation of a federal capacity
would imply either shifting sub-
stantial fiscal expenditures to the
federal level or increasing overall
government spending by creating
new federal spending categories.
The former option is unfeasible at
this stage while the latter is prob-
ably undesirable given the
already large size of the govern-
ment sector in many euro-area
countries.
It is also important to note that our
proposal does not foresee risk
sharing beyond the current ESM
capacities. Our system is essen-
tially a stepped-up framework for
fiscal policy coordination. A much
more far-reaching step would be
to establish a fiscal mechanism
for proper risk sharing between
countries, such as a European
unemployment insurance mech-
anism to complement national
systems. This would introduce
real risk-sharing. However, this
would arguably only be possible if
labour market conditions are har-
monised significantly so that the
mechanism only insures against
truly exogenous events rather
than policy-induced ones (Claeys
et al, 2014). More risk sharing is
desirable because debt levels are
high in many countries and
national-level borrowing might
become constrained and financial
markets might not be able to pro-
vide adequate funding for
stabilisation. But these differ-
ences in starting positions will
make it very difficult to move
ahead with a risk sharing option.
An important question is whether
the treaty changes that would be
required to underpin these
proposed fiscal mechanisms, and
the additional sovereignty
pooling that would go with them,
would still be necessary for the
euro area’s functioning if
competitiveness and debt-
overhang problems had been
tackled. Our view is that they
would. A well-functioning
monetary union requires fiscal
mechanisms to ensure that
shocks are met by the union as a
whole. Problem solving in a
monetary union cannot only be
about putting one’s house in
order; it must also be about
putting the common house in
order. But this necessary change
of philosophy compared to the
current (Maastricht-based)
approach will require a treaty
change that can only be
envisaged once trust between the
‘We propose a
symmetric fiscal
federalism by
exception with
appropriate
legitimacy.’
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countries and citizens of the
monetary union has been
regained by implementing
measures that require no treaty
change but can go a long way
towards solving the current
situation.
TRANSITION TOWARDS THE NEW
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
There is a pressing need to
address two central problems in
the euro area immediately. First, it
is imperative to increase inflation
and demand. Second, it is impera-
tive to address the substantial
macroeconomic policies and
messy debt restructuring where
necessary.
In the next few years, it will be
challenging to manage acute
problems such as high debt, high
unemployment and weak growth.
Leaders should keep in mind a
sense of direction towards a new
governance model that cannot be
achieved overnight. Yet, without a
process starting now that will
eventually lead to the necessary
treaty changes, the daily man-
agement of the various crises
may become impossible. 
judgement (Case C-
370/12) opened the
way for the creation of
additional treaties with-
out changes to the EU
treaty. 
divergences in ULC, in particular
between France, Germany and
Italy. This requires political con-
sensus between governments
because the ECB cannot continue
to act alone to achieve these
objectives. A reformed European
Semester with better timing and a
greater focus on euro-area recom-
mendations could lead to a
change in philosophy.
Correction of imbalances in both
surplus and deficit countries is
essential as is dealing with the
stock of debt through a combina-
tion of more aggressive
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